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BOOK REVIEW:
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY
Authored By: Madison Powers and Ruth Faden*
In this pathbreaking book, senior bioethicists Powers and Faden
confront foundational issues about health and justice. How much
inequality in health can a just society tolerate? In a world filled with
inequalities in health and well-being, which inequalities matter most
and are the most morally urgent to address? In order to answer these
questions, Powers and Faden develop a unique theory of social justice
that, while developed for the specific contexts of public health and
health policy, applies equally well to other realms of social policy,
including education and economic development. The book includes a
careful comparison of Powers and Faden's approach to social justice
with those of other theorists, including notably Rawls, Sen, and
Nussbaum. With their eyes firmly fixed on the injustices of this world
and what is known about their causal determinants, Powers and Faden
place a six dimensional theory of well-being at the heart of their theory
of justice. They then explore the implications of this theory for public
health, the medical market place, and the setting of priorities in health
policy. In the process, they arrive at arresting conclusions about the
moral foundations of public health, childhood, the relevance of social
groups to questions of justice, and the proper role for economic
analysis in social policy. The audience for the book is scholars and
students of bioethics and moral and political philosophy, as well as
anyone interested in public health and health policy.
SOCIAL JUSTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
Reviewed By: Robin L. West**

What does social justice require of our political and legal institutions?
What must our basic social structure do, and be, in order for it to be
minimally just? Madison Powers and Ruth Faden argue in Social
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Justice: the Moral Foundations of Public Health and Health Policy,'
that our institutions must provide a sufficient level of six basic
dimensions, or determinants, of human well-being, for every
individual: a healthy life and life span (relative to the wealth and
technological capability of the society); personal security against
violence; the respect of self and others; the ability to form and to
benefit from attachments to others, particularly in childhood; autonomy
with respect to decisions affecting one's own future; and a healthy
dollop of reasoning abilities. 2
Thus, social justice--not aggregate
utility, or amassed preferences, or wealth, or public choice--is the
"moral foundation of public health." The reason the state must provide
the conditions for health and a reasonable life span to all individuals is
that social justice requires it. And, social justice requires, among much
else, that states guarantee some level of health to their citizenry. This
presents a novel, attractive, and I think compelling account of both the
moral foundation of public health--of why states ought to pursue health
aims--and of social justice--of what justice requires of states.
Along the way, the authors make two central subsidiary
arguments. First, our institutions must prioritize the health and overall
well-being of children when forced to make trade-offs between their
health interests and those of other subpopulations. This is not for the
utility-maximizing reason that children have more "quality adjusted life
years" in front of them than do adults or the elderly, but, rather, for the
thoroughly pragmatic reason that securing children's health is a
necessary prerequisite to their enjoyment, as adults, of self-respect and
the respect of others, attachment, autonomy, reasoning, and so on. 3 For
that reason, it is particularly imperative that we attend to the health
needs of children, both individually and as a population. Second, we
must respond with special and focused urgency to the inequalities
between groups, which can lead to some individuals in subordinated
groups suffering the most profound deprivations of the dimensions of
* Madison Powers, J.D., D. Phil., is director and senior research scholar, Kennedy
Institute of Ethics, and Associate Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University.
Ruth Faden is Wagley Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Director, Berman
Bioethics Institute, Johns Hopkins University.
** Robin, L. West, J.D., J.S.M., is a Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law

Center.
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wellbeing.4 Those inequalities suffered commonly by members of
subordinated groups can stem from multiple sources, and, most
importantly, they have "cascading" effects. 5 Thus, economic, social,
and educational disadvantages taken collectively can create profound
inequalities, and those inequalities in turn can lead to deteriorating
health, a lack of self-respect, a dependency that blunts autonomy, and
so forth, for members of groups that suffer both disadvantages. When
this happens, justice requires a significant political response that brings
the resources of the community to bear on the causes of these joint
inequalities. The multiple sources of inequality that produce these
cascading negative effects on the enjoyment of the six basic dimensions
of wellbeing must be identified and rectified. This is, basically, what
social justice demands.
Also along the way, the authors distinguish their own views
from at least five closely related understandings of the relationships
between public health, social justice, and individual welfare. All of
these distinctions help bring the contours of their own project into very
sharp relief (particularly for outsiders to the public health literature).
First, as the authors point out repeatedly, their own view is similar to,
and owes a substantial debt to, the theory of justice put forward over
the past two decades by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 6 Sen and
Nussbaum have argued at length that social justice requires states to
guarantee a certain set of basic human capabilities to all individuals,
some of which (notably, health, reasoning capacity, and autonomy)
overlap with Faden and Powers' list of the dimensions of wellbeing.
The similarity, however, is theoretical as well as substantive. FadenPowers' list of the dimensions of wellbeing that states are required by
social justice to promote, like Sen-Nussbaum's list of capabilities, are
justified in part by the fact that all human beings, whatever their
distinguishing goals or interests might be, would and should desire to
possess these capabilities or aspects of wellbeing. Both Nussbaum-Sen
and Faden-Powers generate their list of what they view as fundamental
to human life by reference to what anyone or everyone would desire,
regardless of whatever else they might desire that distinguishes their
make
own lives and aspirations from others. Thus, Faden and Powers
7
Sen.
and
Nussbaum
to
much
this
owes
clear that their approach

Id. at 7-9, 71-79, 87-95, 156-58.
5Id. at 8, 71-72.

4

6 Id. at 4,22-32, 37-57, 70, 192.
7

Id. at 4-5, 32, 37-41, 46.
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The list itself is
But there are significant differences.
somewhat different. Nussbaum's is more detailed: she includes the
capability to enjoy reproductive rights, and the capability for play, and
to interact with the natural world, for example, while Faden and
Powers' list is more sparse. More importantly, perhaps, Faden and
Powers urge that social justice requires the actual functioning--or
existence--of the human capacities essential to the enjoyment of the six
interests they identify. Nussbaum and Sen, by contrast, argue that
social justice requires only that the state seek to ensure each
individual's capability to choose to function in the desirable way--the
capability to reason, act autonomously, form attachments, play, interact
with nature, if they choose to do so. For Nussbaum and Sen, it is
important to stress that the decision whether to develop any of the
capabilities they identify must be left to the individual. If an individual
wishes to have good health, she must have the capability of pursuing
health; if she wishes to enjoy rational decision making, she must be
capable of doing so, and so forth.
For Powers and Faden, by contrast, the state must guarantee the
actual functioning of these basic dimensions of well-being, or the actual
existence of the desirable states of affairs, and not just the individual's
potential capability for achieving them. 8 Thus, the state has an
obligation to pursue the individual's health and not just the individual's
capability of enjoying good health should the individual so choose.
The state also has an obligation to pursue decent education for all and
not just create conditions that make it possible for individuals to choose
to lead an educated life, and so forth. There are two reasons for this
shift, in Faden and Powers' formulation, away from capability and to
functioning, and, more broadly, away from both capability and function
both, to a focus actual wellbeing. First, the Sen-Nussbaum focus on
capabilities, rather than actual functioning, in Faden and Powers' view,
is overly driven by concerns for autonomy. In point of fact, most of us
are interested in having minimally good health, not in possessing the
capability to have good health; likewise, we are interested in having a
quality education, not the capability to choose to be educated, and so
forth. The introduction of the concept of capability, rather than the
direct interest at stake, unnecessarily distances us from the actual
requirements of social justice and for reasons that are obscure at best.
We are indeed interested in autonomy, but we are interested in much
else besides, both for ourselves and fellow citizens: good health, an
8

Id. at 37-41.
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adequate life span, healthy intimate attachments to others. 9 But second,
and more important pragmatically, if not theoretically, the focus on
actual functioning rather than the abstracted concern for capability is
dictated by Powers and Faden's concern for children. Children must
possess good health, education, decent familial attachments, and so on,
if they are to have any chance of becoming the adult individuals
capable of enjoying the autonomy so cherished by Nussbaum and Sen.
For children, we are more properly concerned with whether they
possess the actual dimensions of well-being than with their capability
to choose to achieve them.1 0 Autonomy, then, is over-valued in the
Nussbaum-Sen scheme quite generally, but is hugely over-valued with
respect to children and particularly with respect to children's health.
This is a striking and important amendment to Nussbaum-Sen's
capabilities approach to social justice quite generally: it retains and
shares the core value of Nussbaum and Sen's revitalization of this
Aristotelian vision of social justice, but it quite sensibly demotes
autonomy to one dimension of well-being among others, rather than the
prism through which all determinants of well-being are viewed.
Second, social justice, the authors contend, is the moral
foundation for public health, rather than the absolute value of health per
se, or the general duty of beneficence shared by all people with any
significant degree of power, or some utilitarian combination of general
health and the duty of beneficence." Social justice demands that the
state guarantee these six dimensions of well-being, of which health is
one. Health is not itself the moral value that generates the imperative
to promote public health. In this respect, health is on par with
education, autonomy, attachment, security, and respect; it is important,
but it has no pride of place, and it is one desirable outcome of socially
just decision-making. On the other hand, institutions are indeed under
a moral imperative to promote it; it is not merely a discretionary
component of sound public policy. Justice is the imperative behind the
need to attend to health. This understanding of the foundation of the
field turns out to have a number of important, if not immediately
apparent, consequences, primarily for the way the field of public health
is defined and the way the public health professional views his or her
professional identity. The public health professional must attend to the
demands of justice, and what justice requires, in part, is that public
health as a field must address the causes of the multiple inequalities
9 Id. at 39-41.

'oId. at 39.
" Id. at 9.
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that can have negative cascading consequences upon individuals'
enjoyment of these six basic interests. There is good reason, then, for
public health to concern itself with, for example, distributive questions
regarding public resources, the quality of education for the nation's2
poorer children, and the quality of public support to working families.'
These are not political questions far afield from the proper domain of
the public health professional. Poor children, over-worked and underinsured families, and general economic inequality can produce
deprivations that in turn render the minimal dimensions unattainable,
including prominently the interest in good health. Ethicists, policy
mavens, and political philosophers concerned with social justice must
attend to issues of health. But just as important, public health
professionals must unapologetically attend to social injustice. Social
justice is the moral justification for the existence of public health as a
professional concern, and specific social injustices, in the form of
multiple inequalities, are often the cause of the lack of good health for
subordinated populations. This argument as well strikes me as
compelling, presents a fruitful contribution to our understanding of
both the requirements of social justice, and the meaning as well as
justification of the field of public health as a profession and discipline.
Third, the authors distinguish their own approach to social
justice from that of Michael Walzer and others, by stressing that their
concept of social justice is unified, not separated into "spheres" with
differing demands dependent upon the subject of the inquiry. 3 This
too turns out to have consequential implications for the way the field is
defined. Public Health professionals need not and should not be
absolutist, arguing for as much of the resource pie as possible for health
and then leaving to others the task of affecting trade-offs between
differing spheres of justice. Rather, social justice itself sometimes
requires trade-offs between health, education, and attachments; it is the
work of the public health professional to take an interest in the content
of the trade-off--not just as an "advocate" for health, but as a
professional dedicated to social justice.
Fourth, Powers and Faden's ethical theory of social justice is
largely consequentialist, but it is not utilitarian, at least in the "costbenefit" understanding of utilitarianism. States are obligated by social
justice to take such actions as to bring about a certain desirable state of
the world--that is, the sense in which the ethical theory is
12 Id. at 9-10.
"3 Id. at

167-70.
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consequentialist.' 4 But, the state of the world that is desirable and
required by justice is neither a function of the "costs" and "benefits"5
each possible action necessary to achieve some state would accrue,'
nor is it a function of the accumulated preferences for health and so
forth held by the affected parties of some specified set of public
decisions. 16 It is also not a function of the accumulated moral
preferences for this sort of distribution over that sort of distribution
held by those parties represented in a functioning democracy by the
state actors responsible for the relevant decisions.17 Rather, the state
of the world that is desirable, for Faden and Powers, is a function of the
demands of social justice, and it is the job of both the public health
professional and the state actor to ascertain what justice requires, not
just what constituents might want for themselves or might view as
morally desirable. In this respect, Faden and Powers' approach
contributes to an increasing body of work that explores various forms
of what might be thought of as non-utilitarian consequentialist theories
of ethics and justice. This approach includes an ethical orientation that
holds consequences of actions to be the main determinant of the moral
value of an act, but identifies particular consequences--a desirable state
of the world in which health, attachment, education, etc. are enjoyed by
all--rather than a minimization of "costs" or a maximization of
"benefit,," "preferences," or "utility" as the worldly consequences that
are of value.
And finally, Faden and Powers' understanding of the demands
of social justice is keenly alert to inequalities, particularly multiple
inequalities of the cascading sort. Inequalities trigger an awareness that
a particular group is likely lacking in one or more of the basic
dimensions of well-being that social justice requires the state to
protect.' 8 In this way, their understanding of social justice overlaps
with the concerns of those who view social justice as centrally, and not
just incidentally, about social inequalities. But social justice as Faden
and Powers develop it does not require any sort of rigid
egalitarianism. 19 An ideal world in which all enjoy some basic,
minimal-but-sufficient levels of health, education, autonomy, personal
security, attachment, and respect is compatible with a considerable
14

Id. at 32-34.

"6 Id. at 144-56.
1 Id. at 153-56.
'7 Id. at 184-90.
'8 Id.

'9Id.

at 3-6, 50-57, 71-78, 87-99.
at 50-64.
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degree of unobjectionable inequality in distributions of resources. It is
also fully compatible with a robust capitalism and the existence of
private markets, in most, albeit not all, commodifiable goods. Thus,
the Faden-Powers conception of social justice is neither as tied to
autonomy as Nussbaum and Sen's, nor as committed to egalitarianism
as might be various neo-marxist or anti-subordinationist conceptions.
In essence it is more "substantive" than both: value attaches neither to
abstract autonomy nor to concrete equality, but rather, to a particular,
substantive account of an ideal social world: one in which all human
beings enjoy good health, a decent life span, the respect of self and
others, the ability to reason, healthy intimate attachments, are free from
fears for their own personal safety, and have the autonomy to make
decisions regarding their own life plan.
That, in my view, is the heart of this book's contribution, and
virtually all of it--at least what I have attempted to summarize above-strikes me as basically sound. I had thought that Nussbaum and Sen's
theory of justice was by far the most compelling Aristotelian, neoMarxist, but nevertheless loosely liberal view of justice around, until I
Faden and Powers nicely articulate what the
read this book.
Nussbaum-Sen approach gets right and wrong, corrects it, and applies it
vigorously to issues of public health. The argumentation is extremely
solid throughout. The focus on and then critique of a range of "costbenefit" approaches to public health and to social justice is particularly
good and will prove useful to many readers interested in cost-benefit
analysis, well beyond the public health community. Rather than
address small differences, in the remainder of this review, I will focus
on a question that, as far as I can tell, Faden and Powers did not directly
address.
That question is simply this: "Why Social Justice?" Why
should states, state actors, or the social institutions states facilitate
pursue social justice, regardless of how it is defined? Powers and
Faden don't address this in detail. What they do address, and in great
detail, is the answer to this question: "What does Social Justice require
of our state and the social institutions the state facilitates?" Their
answer: social justice requires states (either through intermediary social
institutions or directly) to provide for a minimum, but sufficient, level
of six basic dimensions of human well-being, one of which is health.
They do not, though, as far as I can tell, ask a prior question and that is
why states are or should be required to promote social justice at all,
regardless of how social justice might be defined. In other words,
Faden and Powers' project is to specify what social justice requires,
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with respect to health and so forth, of decently functioning states. They
don't ask, or answer, the prior question--what it is that requires social
justice. To state this one other way, risking redundancy, even assuming
Powers and Faden are correct that social justice requires states and
institutions to promote the six basic dimensions of well-being, what is
it that requires states to promote social justice?
Perhaps it seems too clear to these two authors to argue the
point, that states are required to pursue the ends of social justice. Why
else would we have states in the first place, if not to promote social
justice? The only difficult question is what social justice requires, and
that is the subject of the book. Or, perhaps they don't argue the point
because they view it as outside the scope of their project. It seems to
me, though, that the answer is not so obvious and that it is important to
their project, whether or not outside its scope. In the next section, I will
suggest a few reasons why the question is both meaningful and
difficult. In the section after that, I will try to answer it, within the
spirit of the Powers-Faden theory of justice, as I understand it. In the
conclusion, I'll briefly speculate on why in my view the question "Why
social justice?" does not get the attention it deserves, not only in Faden
and Powers' strong book, but also elsewhere in legal and political
philosophy.
I.

WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE?

So, are there any reasons to think that states might not be
required to pursue social justice, no matter how it is defined? I think
there are at least three. First, ought famously implies "can," and it
might be that at least our "State"--meaning the United States' national
government--can not promote social justice, in which case it can not be
true that it "ought" to. Why can't it? Well, one might argue--plenty of
people do--that Article One of the United States Constitution specifies
a very short list of congressional powers, and the power to promote
social justice is just nowhere on that list. 20 Congress has power to pass

such laws that are necessary to regulate commerce 21 under Article One,
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment specifies that if states
fail to do so, Congress also has the power to take such actions that are
necessary to ensure that individuals are granted equal protection and
22
due process of law by states. Nothing else in the Constitution even
20 U.S. CONST. art.
21

22

1,

§ 8.

id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, 5.
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comes close to granting Congress the power to pursue social justice.
And, it is not at all obvious that either "commerce" or the capacious
phrases of the Fourteenth Amendment are sufficiently elastic to
embrace social justice, no matter how defined.
Of course, Congress has, from time to time, done so anyway.
We do all enjoy such programs as Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid, all of which seem to fulfill some of the imperatives of social
justice that Faden and Powers identify. Those New Deal programs,
however, in retrospect on the century just passed, increasingly look like
They
constitutional anomalies rather than constitutional paradigms.
just might turn out, after the constitutional dust settles, to be the
collective exception that proves the rule, rather than any sort of
"constitutional moment" that definitely if obliquely expanded
Congress' power to legislate toward social justice ends. It has, after all,
proven exceedingly difficult in the decades that followed the New Deal
to build on those programs, in the national legislative agenda, toward a
more robust safety net, or set of shared welfare rights, or social justice
agenda, that would protect the interests Faden and Powers identify.
One reason (among others) why it has been so hard to establish robust
social welfare laws, or rights, in this country--much harder than in
Europe or Canada, for example--might be the existence of a widely
shared sense, or worry, or presumption, or rock-solid belief, that the
United States Constitution, perhaps uniquely among the world's
constitutions, denies the United States law-making branch the power to
act in these areas, apparently preserving those fields for governance by
the states.2 3
Over the last twenty years particularly, on the rare occasion
when Congress has taken some act that apparently seemed designed to
promote one of these interests, the constitutionality of those acts have
been quickly brought into question. 24
For example, when the
constitutionality of the Family and Medical Leave Act 25--a federal law
passed in the 1990s that requires that large employers provide very
limited and unpaid leave to mothers or fathers with newborns--was
challenged in Court, that act was eventually successfully defended.

For a good restatement of this traditional view, See Developments, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1065 (1969).
24
See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks
23

authority to create a civil cause of action for unredressed violence against women);
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2007).
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However, it was not defended on the straightforward "social justice"
grounds that the law is necessary to improve the quality of attachments
of mothers and infants (or any other combination of dependents and
care providers) and that Congress was right to so find. Rather, the law
was defended and ultimately sustained on the quite different ground
that the act was necessary to combat illegal sex discrimination in the
workplace--something well established as within Congress' commerce
clause powers, if not its remedial powers under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 26 Nowhere did the Court suggest--and
nowhere did the advocates of the law argue--that the law should be
sustained because it furthers legislative goals necessitated by the state's
obligation to pursue ends of social justice, including the goal of
strengthening family attachments in the face of onerous workloads.
There is simply no clear authority for the proposition that
Congress even has the power, much less the duty, to legislate in such a
way as to promote health, education, attachment, autonomy, selfrespect, or individual security, and plenty of authority for the
proposition that its powers to do so are limited. Now of course, states
presumably have this power, but states have the economic wherewithal
to provide for the six interests that social justice requires only to
varying degrees, resulting in the massive inequalities that Faden and
27
Powers rightly argue must be corrected by concerted political action.
If the national government is constitutionally disabled from promoting
social justice and if state governments are precluded by limited
resources from doing so in a minimally equal way, then it is awkward
at best to say that governments, whether national or state, ought to do
so. I would like to call the national part of this dilemma the "problem
of authority." Without some authority to act, Congress lacks power,
and if it lacks power, it simply can not do what Powers and Faden
declare it ought to do.
Further, and entirely apart from the problem of authority, one
might argue--again, plenty of people do--that, even assuming a state at
any level (federal or state) can promote social justice it should not, the
dangers posed by an over-reaching state outweigh the dangers to life
and limb posed by individuals' collective inability to enjoy some
minimal level of health, security, education, attachments, autonomy,
and self-respect. It is better to risk these material deprivations than to
26

Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)

27

For a compelling argument that school inequality, for example, is as much a matter

of inter-state inequality as intra-state inequality, See Goodwin Liu, Education,
Equality, and NationalCitizenship, 116 YALE L. J. 330 (2006).
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risk the tyranny that would come with the territory of guarding against
them. A state charged with the task of assuring these minimal interests
would perforce have to be granted so much power over our private and
social lives as to itself be a danger, not only to our actual enjoyment of
those minimal interests, but also to any number of other interests we
might seek to enjoy as well. Such a state might, for example, have to
be so confiscatory of private property as to make life unpleasant for all-more unpleasant than the cumulative affects some of us would suffer
by a world in which a state is not so tasked. What we would gain in
security with respect to the basic interests, we would lose in
vulnerability to an overly powerful central government. That is a tradeoff that might be struck by different people in different ways and at
different points along a continuum, but trade we must. The minimum
for which Faden and Powers argue may be set quite low, but
nevertheless it might imply too large an enhancement of governmental
power as to be worth the risk. It is better to limit the state to more
limited tasks--protection against outside threats, for example--than to
take that risk, whatever might be the enhancement of individual wellbeing.
Third, democratic principles of representative government
might limit the degree to which states ought to pursue social justice and
for two separate reasons. First, it may be that representatives ought to
represent only the interests, including the basic interests identified by
Faden and Powers, of their constituents. If so, then the basis for public
health is democracy, not social justice, and the extent to which public
health of all, including subordinated populations, is required of states
depends upon representational facts. Namely, if the interests of
dominant populations are simply weightier than the interests of
subordinated populations, then a good deal of inequality in the
distribution of goods that might satisfy those interests is tolerable.
Second, democracy might best be understood as a system of
government in which, ideally, not only the "first order" desires of
constituents are represented and pursued by legislators, but also their
moral preferences for particular distributions of resources are respected
and, where possible, reflected in enacted law. Thus, if constituents
think its morally best for states to invest shared resources totally in
collective self-defense and only a little or not at all in public health,
then that is what states ought to do. Either way, whether states are
understood as best promoting their constituents interests or their
constituents' "moral preferences," expenditures on public health are
both justified and required, if at all, by reference to those preferences or
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the representation of those interests, and not by reference to any
conception of social justice.
I.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEALISM

Now, why, in the face of these objections, might states be obligated to
pursue social justice on behalf of their citizens? To ask the same
question, but in a way more familiar to constitutional lawyers
concerned with these sets of issues, what is the authority for the
existence of this obligation and is the claim of authority a compelling
one? The possibility most frequently alluded to by Powers and Faden-although not argued in any detail--is that the source of the obligation is
a particular moral and ethical imperative: we all have a "basic human
right" to these dimensions of well-being that social justice requires
states to promote. 28 From those human rights follows the obligation of
states, as well as other social (and international) institutions, to take the
actions necessary to protect human rights. This answer is not fully
satisfying. First, it is not clear that our human rights protect these
dimensions, or that, if they do, they impose obligations on states, rather
than on other social institutions, to meet them. Nor is it clear why, if it
is our human rights that imply the obligation, our state or any other is
not required to do what it can to meet the same rights held by noncitizens. In other words, it is not clear why states have particular
obligations based on human rights to tend to the dimensions of
wellbeing of their own citizens rather than all humans--the citizens of
the world. Most damningly, though, it is not clear how the United
States government could possibly have an obligation to meet the human
rights even of only its own citizens, if its own constitution denies it the
power to do so, as briefly argued above.
A second possibility, not pursued at all by Faden and Powers, is
that the constitutional claim premised on the short list of Article One
powers made above is wrong, and in point of fact, the United States
Constitution does impose positive obligations upon the national
government to provide for these basic dimensions of well-being. The
"authority" for the existence of the basic obligation of states--including
the United States government--to pursue social justice, then, would
basically be positive constitutional law. This is barely arguable as
evidenced by the still lively, but fading, constitutional discourse in
28 SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note

1, at 45-49, 85-87, 180.
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dissenting scholarship supporting the proposition that, contrary to
various opinions of the Supreme Court, the Constitution does indeed
recognize certain positive welfare rights.2 9 Nevertheless, as a matter of
brute-fact constitutional law (rather than constitutional aspiration), the
position that the Constitution not only permits but also requires positive
welfare rights, and hence imposes duties on legislators and other state
actors to protect them, is becoming less and less plausible with each
declaration by the contemporary Court that the Constitution does no
such thing. 30 As Dworkin argued some time ago, Constitutional law
(unlike, perhaps, constitutional politics or constitutional morality) is a
product of both the best political and moral reading the actual
constitution can sustain, as a matter of interpretation, and of some
minimal "fit" with the pattern of decision-making by its authoritative
interpreters, which is the collective known as the Supreme Court. Even
if supported by morality, language, text, or political theory, it has
become wildly implausible to read our Constitution, as understood by
the Supreme Court, as containing any sort of positive welfare rights or
imposing any sort of duties on legislators to provide for them.
A third and to my mind very promising possibility is alluded to,
but again not argued in any detail, in some of Martha Nussbaum's
writings on the closely aligned "capabilities approach" to matters of
social justice, both here and globally. Particularly in her book Women
and Human Development, Nussbaum argues at various points that the
capabilities approach (or more broadly for these purposes, the
"wellbeing" approach) ought to be understood by liberal constitutional
states as simply a "good idea"--one that states with liberal constitutions
will hopefully embrace as a guide to decent governance. 3 1 The
suggestion, in other words, is that constitutional liberal democracies
ought to protect these interests (or, in her argument, these capabilities)
simply because it would be a very good idea for them to do so.
This might initially sound a bit vacuous, so let me turn the
formulation around a bit, in order to make it more specific, and
possibly more plausible. I would put it this way: perhaps it is the very
29

See, e.g.,

CHARLES BLACK,

A NEW

BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED

UNNAMED (1999); Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the 14h Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979); Robin West,
Katrina, The Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1127 (2006); Robin West, UnenumeratedDuties, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (2006).
AND

See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 103 (2000).
30
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good idea of constitutionalism, whatever might be the positive content
of actual constitutions, which suggests that states should promote social
justice. In the past, perhaps, a different idea of constitutionalism held
sway: the idea of constitutionalism, at the time of the drafting of our
own constitution, for example, was that governmental power should be
restrained, separated, or contained in some way. These days, though, a
different idea of what it means to embrace constitutionalism might be
carrying the day. Knowing what we now know about the extreme
vulnerabilities of citizens in liberal market economies, given what we
now know about the misery to which vulnerability and deprivation
leads, knowing what we now know about the extreme precariousness of
one's economic wellbeing in an economy that treats labor as a
commodity, and knowing what we now know about the difficulties
facing even the most rugged individualists trying to move from having
nothing to having something, a Constitution--any Constitution--that
truly emanates from the people and that establishes a government that
truly serves the people, requires the state to promote social justice.
This seems like a very sensible "constitutional idea" for a modern era,
whatever might have been the case in the founding era. It is, for
example, a very good reason for individuals in the proverbial states of
nature that they may find themselves in, to come together and form a
constitution, not just establish a sovereign government, states should,
such individuals might think, pre-commit to provide for social justice.
That a constitution commits the state to social justice might also be a
good reason for citizens to feel and profess some loyalty to their own
constitution; it is a constitution about which citizens could feel some
pride. A constitution that requires the state it constitutes to promote
social justice, might also cloak the democracy it creates with some
degree of legitimacy as well: such a democracy, and not just such a
state, is legitimate, not only because it represents constituents'
preferences (and so forth), but also because it is pre-committed to
social justice. Although surely not dispositive, it is certainly relevant
that just such a "constitutional idea" tracks actual constitutional
provisions that are now quite routinely contained in constitutions
written in the late twentieth century, rather than the late eighteenth. In
short, that states ought to promote social justice is a morally appealing
notion of what constitutional governance should be about. It is not just
a "good idea" that liberal states might embrace. It is also a "good
constitutional idea" that liberal democracies must promote social
justice.
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Finally, if "states must promote social justice" ranks as a good
constitutional idea, it might also be a good guide not only to the
criticism of the United States Constitution, but also, conceivably, to its
The Fourteenth
interpretation and perhaps amendment as well.
Amendment of the United States Constitution contains broad
guarantees that surely can be read to suggest the existence of such
duties, Supreme Court authority notwithstanding.3 2 The preamble to
the United States Constitution likewise contains clauses suggesting as
much,3 3 as does the Declaration of Independence,3 4 as well as any

number of state constitutional provisions.

Whether specifically so

mandated by the Constitution's text or history, it might be fair to say
that the notion that states ought to promote social justice is arguably
within even our own constitutional tradition, and whether that is too

much of a stretch, it is certainly well within the emerging constitutional
traditions of the world.

If so--if the obligation of states to promote

social justice is a "good constitutional idea"--then it might be an idea
that could impress itself upon legislators, including United States
senators and congressmen. If the obligation of states to promote social
justice is a good constitutional idea, it might sensibly become a part of
the moral duty of lawmakers at every level of government.

32 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1 states that "no state shall deny citizens the equal

protection or due process of the laws." Taking out the double negatives, states are
required to actively do something: to protect citizens with law, and to do so equally.
It may be that to "protect" citizens with law requires states to protect their personal
security, safeguard their autonomy, and so forth. I argue this at greater length in
UnenumeratedDuties, supra note 29; Katrina, the Legal Question Doctrine, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 29; and, in PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9-104 (1994).
33 U.S. CONST., pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, on Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility... promote the general
Welfare... do ordain and establish this Constitution .... ").

34 Specifically, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, pmbl. (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying
its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shallseem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness")(emphasis added).
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III.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY

Faden and Powers are surely not the only writers loosely within the
"social justice" field to not specifically address the constitutional or
quasi-constitutional source of the state's obligation to pursue social
justice. This is a lacuna--a gap in the literature--caused in part, I think,
by a sense of disciplinary boundaries between the fields of political
theory and ethics, on the one hand, and constitutional law and theory on
the other. The handful of dissenting constitutional theorists that have
asserted various sorts of arguments for the existence of welfare rights,
typically argue that legislators must have the power to legislate in such
a way as to enforce them and rarely reach the question of whether
legislators have a duty to do so. Constitutional theorists that oppose the
existence of such rights do so on the grounds that the Constitution not
only imposes no such obligation on legislators, but it also does not
grant power to legislators to promote social justice, should they so
choose. Thus, there are very few writers within the constitutional
canon that specifically address whether legislators are under moral or
Within
constitutional obligations to promote social justice.35
that
Sen
and
Nussbaum,
Powers,
Faden,
as
such
writers
philosophy,
address these issues typically assume that states have the power to
pursue social justice and then proceed to argue that since justice is a
virtue, it is one that imposes obligations on whoever has the power to
promote it. They only rarely, if ever, attend to the possibility that our
positive, inherited constitution might constitute an obstacle, rather than
a vehicle, for social justice. Therefore, they rarely attend with any
detail to the project of constructing an alternative constitutional vision
that might centralize, rather than marginalize, the duty of legislators to
promote social justice. So, in brief, constitutional lawyers and theorists
pay little or no attention to the possibility that legislators may have
specific moral duties to attend to the demands of social justice.
Philosophers, on the other hand, do not pay much attention to "the
problem of authority": the need to find either some sort of authority-constitutional legal, political, or otherwise--for the existence of the
social and moral duties for which they argue or to argue explicitly that
no authority, beyond the authority of strong moral argument, need be
found. There is a space, then, or a gap, at least in the United States
35

One exception is

LAWRENCE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES

(2002).
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scholarship, between the arguments propounded by our contemporary
moral philosophers, including Nussbaum, Sen, Faden, and Powers, for
state obligations to pursue social justice and the arguments propounded
by even sympathetic constitutional theorists, arguing, at most, that the
state legislative branch has the power to enact law of this sort and
rarely, if ever, touching upon whether they have a positive duty to do
SO.
This disciplinary gap, I think, has serious consequences.
Various possible relations between constitutional theory and moral
philosophy, all of which are very much relevant to any philosophical
discussion of the demands of social justice, are obscured by this
division of constitutional and philosophical labor. Let me just suggest
two.
First, the main skeptical argument rehearsed above--that since
Congress has no constitutional authority to pursue social justice, there
cannot possibly be any such moral duty to do so--only holds if the
Constitution is unchangeable.
But the Constitution is not
unchangeable, and whether it ought to be changed might depend quite
crucially on whether Faden, Powers, Nussbaum, or Sen are right about
the existence of this moral duty that is arguably at odds with our
constitutional scheme of governance. In other words, if Faden, et al.,
are right that there is a duty, and the Supreme Court and countless
commentators are right that there is no constitutional authorization for
Congress to act on that duty, then what follows is not that Faden et al.
are wrong, but, rather, that constitutional law ought to be faulted and
changed. "Ought implies can," and "can't implies no duty," but only if
the "can't" is truly a "can't," otherwise, "ought" implies the need to
change the range of the constitutionally possible. Constitutional law is
not, at the end of the day, a law of nature like the laws of planetary
motion. It is contingent, positive and malleable. But, this possibility-the possibility that the Constitution should be faulted and therefore
should be changed because it fails to create an explicit Congressional
power to act in accordance with Congress' moral duty--is obfuscated
by this division of labor: philosophers' inattentiveness to questions of
authority and constitutionalists' inattentiveness to questions of moral
duty.
The second possibility also obscured by this division of labor is
just this: if "states"--meaning states in the ordinary sense, such as the
state of Maryland or Tennessee--do have the power to promote social
justice, even if Congress does not, then it should very much matter to
constitutional lawyers and theorists, no less than moral philosophers,
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what social justice requires of them when they exercise that power.
lawyers, however, have been overwhelmingly
Constitutional
concerned, at least over the last half century, with the limits, rather than
the content, of legislative powers, and, as a result, they elide just that
question. What states ought to do to promote the ends of social justice
is a philosophical question to be sure, but it is also one of the central
political questions of our day. And, it may be a "good constitutional
idea" for states to be obligated to promote social justice--or at least so
Martha Nussbaum, Ruth Faden, and Madison Powers all in different
ways seemingly suggest. If they are right and I think they are, then this
ought to be a central, not peripheral, concern of constitutional lawyers
and scholars, regardless of whether it is state or federal actors that carry
out this central governmental obligation. If that is right, then Faden
and Powers' book would be a good place to start the conversation
regarding what state actors ought to be doing when they act on this
duty. Faden and Powers have produced a compelling and important
argument regarding what social justice requires of states and the
various social institutions they facilitate. One can only hope that their
articulation of this very good constitutional idea--that as a very
fundamental, constitutional matter states ought to promote social justice
and that what that means is that states must provide for human wellbeing along these six crucial dimensions--will receive a wide
readership, not only by public health professionals or the lay public, but
also by constitutional lawyers and theorists.

